2.6 KiB
2.6 KiB
title, task, lineage_type, upstream_source, upstream_sha, imported_at, prompt_class, upstream_changes, author, validated
| title | task | lineage_type | upstream_source | upstream_sha | imported_at | prompt_class | upstream_changes | author | validated |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| List of Papers | import | https://github.com/trailofbits/awesome-ml-security/blob/d7fe4fa9/impossibility_research.md | d7fe4fa9 | 2026-06-26 | catalogue | accepted | upstream | false |
List of Papers
- You can’t solve AI security problems with more AI
- Adversaries Can Misuse Combinations of Safe Models
- On the Necessity of Auditable Algorithmic Definitions for Machine Unlearning
- Data Poisoning Won't Save You From Facial Recognition
- On the Impossible Safety of Large AI Models
- Beyond Labeling Oracles: What does it mean to steal ML models?
- Text Embeddings Reveal (Almost) As Much As Text
- Planting Undetectable Backdoors in Machine Learning Models
- Motivating the Rules of the Game for Adversarial Example Research
- On Evaluating Adversarial Robustness
- LLM Censorship: A Machine Learning Challenge or a Computer Security Problem?
- Watermarks in the Sand: Impossibility of Strong Watermarking for Generative Models
- When Your AIs Deceive You: Challenges of Partial Observability in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback
- Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, They Are Features
- On Adaptive Attacks to Adversarial Example Defenses
- Fundamental Tradeoffs between Invariance and Sensitivity to Adversarial Perturbations
- Data Authenticity, Consent, & Provenance for AI are all broken: what will it take to fix them?
- Proof-of-Learning is Currently More Broken Than You Think
- On the (In)feasibility of ML Backdoor Detection as an Hypothesis Testing Problem
- Breach By A Thousand Leaks: Unsafe Information Leakage in `Safe' AI Responses
- UnUnlearning: Unlearning is not sufficient for content regulation in advanced generative AI